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THE DECLINING USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
BY COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
MICHAEL D. MCCLINTOCK*
I. Introduction
In 1931, Judge Cardozo, in describing what he viewed as the prejudice held by
judges and practitioners toward law reviews, stated the following:
The law-review essay has felt beyond the common lot the repressive
cruelty of prejudice.
There has been prejudice against it on two grounds - prejudice
because it was not bound, and prejudice because its authors, for the most
part, were not practitioners, but teachers.
If the prejudice on the score of paper were up rooted, there would
remain, as I have said, another: the distrust of the dominie, the recluse,
the academic scholar. For a long time the practicing lawyers, and the
judges, recruited for the most part from the ranks of the practitioners,
were suspicious that there would be a loss of practical efficiency if the
teachers in the universities were not made to know their place. At the
worst they might be philosophers, and they were theorists at best. In part
the distrust was of a piece with a belief that man thinking is less efficient
than man doing!
Despite this lachrymose view of law reviews, the bias against them faded as the
law review became a recognized secondary authority in judicial opinions.2 Today,
however, many of the same issues that formed this early prejudice and framed the
debate over the utility of law reviews have appeared again. Judges and practitioners
increasingly feel that there is a lack of legal scholarship that they can use when they
face their daily case loads. They complain that academia is losing touch with the
practice of law.3 Academics, on the other hand, argue that they are taking the study
of law to a higher level. No longer teaching simply doctrine, professors are
* Attorney, McAfee & TaI Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Judicial Clerk, Honorable Judge Robert H.
Henry, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Dec. 1998 to Dec. 1999. J.D. Summa Cur
Laude, 1998, Oklahoma City University. B.S., 1992, United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point,
New York. The author would like to thank Professor Alfred Brophy, Professor Michael Gibson, and Andrew
Lester for their comments and criticisms, and Monique McClintock for her patience and understanding.
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS FROM
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LEGAL PERIODICALS at vii-viii (Association of American Law Sch. ed., 1931)
(noting further that law reviews are viewed with a jaundiced eye because they are more like pamphlets
than bound treatises).
2. See infra notes 10-66 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 68-115 and accompanying text.
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emphasizing the legal theories and the policies behind the judicial decisions in order
to mold lawyers who are not merely doctrinal robots, but who are scholars of the
law.4 Further, many academics argue that non-doctrinal scholarship is the most
effective tool to influence the development of the law.5
The foundation of this article is an empirical study of the citations of law reviews
by the United States Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state supreme courts.
Recently, citation surveys have become popular by numerically ranking law journals
based on the number of citations a particular journal or article receives by other law
journals, or by a single or narrow set of courts.6 However, the idea to study the use
of law review articles as judicial precedent appeared as early as 1930.!
Beyond ranking the law reviews, the purpose of this survey is to analyze citation
trends by courts over the past twenty years. If the prejudice Judge Cardozo spoke of
nearly seventy years ago has in fact resurfaced, there should be a decline in the use
of legal scholarship in judicial opinions. This survey reveals a 47.35% decline in the
use of legal scholarship by courts over the past two decades, the most notable decline
occurring in the past ten years.
The citation of law reviews in judicial decisions is by no means a complete
measure of law reviews' influence on judges, practitioners, or the law.8 However, a
decline in citation, when combined with the pleas of judges and practitioners for
more "practical" articles, is persuasive evidence that the bar is finding legal
scholarship less relevant to the practice of law.' In the face of this decline, law
review boards retain unbridled discretion regarding publication decisions for their
journals. In fact, there are few, if any, standards for evaluating articles for
publication."0 If student edited law journals do not respond to the bar's requests for
"practical" articles, then the dialogue between practitioners, judges, and academics,
which began in 1875 in the first student-edited journal, may soon come to an end.
4. See infra notes 116, 120-41 and accompanying text.
5. See infra noteo 115-35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 142.
7. See D.B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the
Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (1930).
8. This is not to say that the only way for an article to influence the law is to receive a citation
by the court - quite th- contrary. For example, many articles which criticize or deconstruct an opinion,
or for that matter, this article, will likely never receive a citation by a court. Citation is not the only
justification for legal scholarship; however, the use of law review articles by the courts as a secondary
source of authority is a concrete measure of an article's influence on courts. See J.M Balkin & Stanford
Levinson, How to Wii Cites and Influence People, 71 CHu.-KENT L. REV. 843, 843-46 (1996).
Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with using the number of citations an article or law review
receives as a "measuring stick," it is the way (at least superficially) many people, including law school
professors, define the success of their articles. For example, I am acquainted with several law school
professors who utilize citation survey rankings of the various journals when deciding where to publish
their articles - choosng the highest "ranked" law review that accepts their article for publication.
Another professor condacts periodic Westlaw searches to determine the number of "hits" he has received,
commenting when the numbers are good. It is unlikely these are isolated incidents.
9. See Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their
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II. The Origin of Student-Edited Law Reviews and Court Citation
A. Early History of Law Reviews
Initially, student-edited law reviews did not enjoy immediate success and struggled
to achieve a place of stature in the legal community. Early citations by the courts,
however, helped to elevate law journals' prestige and perceived persuasive authority
as a secondary source." In order to evaluate properly any changes that need to be
made regarding the current choice of topics for legal scholarship, it is important to
understand the goals of the early law reviews and to examine the type of article that
courts found useful.
Since at least the colonial era, judges, lawyers and the public have carried on a
dialogue through printed journals. Some of the first printed works in America related
to law. 2 By the 1720s and 1730s, judges printed charges to their grand juries in
new papers and politicians and lawyers took their cases to the press in an effort to
shape public opinion." The growth of the common law and the expanding
jurisdiction in newly formed states required specialized publications so that the bar
could stay informed of the rapidly changing law.' In order to meet this new
demand, legal scholars began authoring treatises and case reporters." These
treatises, however, were universal in scope and generally dealt with law that had been
decided in past decades. 6 Further, the volume of cases decided in the varied
jurisdictions made it difficult for practitioners to keep up with recent decisions in the
new case reporters. 7 These factors set the stage for the soon-to-be-developed law
review.
The first legal periodicals in America were published around 1808.18 These early
magazines, published to appeal to both lawyers and the general public, included
articles on parochial subjects as well as reports of recent cases. By 1850 only ten
11. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., PHILOPOLITEs [WILLIAM PENN], THE EXCELLENT PRIVILEGE OF LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY BEING THE BIRTH-RIGHT OF THE FREE-BORN SUIBJECrs OF ENGLAND (1687) [hereinafter
WILLIAM PENN].
13. See Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS W. 739, 750 (1985) (citing FREDERICK C.
HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 207 (3d ed. 1942) (noting that the legal news
of the day was provided by general circulation of newspapers until members of the legal profession
demanded a medium of their own)). The primary authority for this article's historical review of law
journals is the Swygert & Bruce article; therefore, the analysis in this section is based in large part on
their well-researched work. See JAMES LOGAN, THE CHARGE DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH TO THE
GRAND JURY (1723).
14. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 747.
15. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the Origins of American Legal Treatises, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 547, 571-76 (1993).
16. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 751.
17. See id.
18. See id.; see also Michael L. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History and Influence of the Law
Review Institution, 30 AKRON L. REV. 15, 30-38 (1996) (discussing the history of legal periodicals).
19. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 752-53.
1998]
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journals had survived out of the thirty commercial publications that had begun
circulation near the turn of the century.
Then, in 1852, Asa Fish and Henry Wharton published the first issue of the
American Law Register, a journal that survives to the present as the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.2 The Register contained lead articles that were followed
by digests and notes about recent decisions as well as professional news.' Like all
previous law journals, it was a commercial venture that was not associated with a
university. It was not until 1896 that law students at the University of Pennsylvania
changed its name and began to edit the journal.' As commercial legal periodicals,
these journals survived by tailoring their publication to their intended audience and,
at the beginning, that audience was lawyers and judges. By the mid- to late 1 800s,
there were approx;Cmately 158 legal periodicals being published in the United
States.
Emerging technology played a significant role in the proliferation of legal
periodicals. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the advent of high-speed
rotary printing presses and the near simultaneous development of woodpulp newsprint
made publication of student-edited law reviews a financial possibility.' The increase
in the publication of books generally during the late nineteenth century reflected a
significant increase in legal publications. "The number of law books published each
year hit record levels in the 1880s and 1890s. In 1880, 62 new law books were
published in the United States; in 1882, 261; in 1889, 410; and in 1896, 507."'
Student-edited law reviews emerged just prior to the twentieth century. The Albany
Law School Journal, the first student-edited journal, was published in 1875; however,
20. See id. at 754-55 (citing American Legal Periodicals, 2 ALB. L.J. 445 (1870)).
21. See Joseph P. Flanagan, Introduction, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 69 (1951) (discussing the history
of the Pennsylvania Law Review).
22. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 755-56 (citing Review of Swan's Tennessee Reports, I
AM. L. REG. 382 (1853)).
23. See Flanagan, supra note 21, at 69.
24. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 742 (citing E. WOODRUFF, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF LAw 25 (1898)).
25. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace,
71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 615, 620-21 (1996) (suggesting further that the internet may make the publication
of traditional law reviews obsolete) (citing HELMTr LEHMANN-HAUPT, THE BOOK IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY OF THE MAKING AND SELLING OF BOOKS IN THE UNITED STATES 162-65 (1951) (tracing
development of the large cylinder press for newspaper printing), and id. at 166-70 (detailing technological
changes and growth in fie paper-making industry in nineteenth century); ALFRED M. LEE, THE DAILY
NEWSPAPER IN AMERIck: THE EvOLUTION OF A SOCIAL INSTRUMENT 118-21 (1937) (discussing the
modernization of the printing press), and id. at 100-03 (detailing newspapers' transition to woodpulp
newsprint in the late 1869s and early 1870s)). Professor Hibbitts notes, for example, that "[t]he Michigan
Law Review. . . premier[ed] in 1901 with an $800 loan from the School's Board of Regents - not an
insignificant sum at the time, but at least within the realm of institutional possibility." Hibbitts, supra.
at 621 n.28 (citing E. Blythe Stason, The Law Review - Its First Fifty Years, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1134,
1134 (1952)).
26. Id. at 621 (footriote omitted) (citing Cheap Books, AM. L.J., June 21, 1884, at 105, and 2 JOHN
TEBEt, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES 676-77, 682, 689 (1875)).
[Vol. 51:659
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it only survived one academic year Competition with other "commercial" law
journals caused many early student-edited law reviews to fail. Finally, after attempts
by Albany and Columbia to publish a student-edited journal," Harvard was the first
to publish a student-edited law review that has been continuously published from its
founding to the present day.'
The first issue of the Harvard Law Review was published in the spring of 1887."
It contained two lead articles, notes about the school, reports of moot court
arguments, summaries of class lectures, case digests and comments, book reviews,
and a list of recently published books." One of the principal purposes of the journal
was to convey to the professional world the messages and the scholarship of the law
school's faculty3" and to "be serviceable to the profession at large."33
After the success at Harvard, five other law schools began to publish journals
modeled after the Harvard Law Review. Yale was the first to follow suit, publishing
its first law review in 1891, followed by Pennsylvania in 1896, Columbia in 1901,
and Michigan in 19020 These law schools realized the educational benefits of
student-run periodicals. The publications gave the schools prestige and credibility,
and established the schools as serious legal institutions.
Northwestern was the fifth school to start a law review.3 6 Realizing the decreasing
utility of more "copies" of the Harvard Law Review, Northwestern decided to forge
new ground 7 Following the Harvard format, the editors chose to narrow the focus
of their publication to the law of Illinois 8 The editors explained:
Undoubtedly the field of law reviews of a general character is already
overcrowded. Moreover, it must be conceded that such reviews, however
excellent, enlist the interest of but a small minority of the practicing
lawyers of Illinois. It is believed, however, that there is a genuine and
27. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 764.
28. See id. at 766. In 1885 Columbia Law School started the second student-edited legal periodical,
the Columbia Jurist. See A HIsTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 103 (Julius
Goebel, Jr. ed., 1955).
29. The Harvard Law Review is generally credited with being the oldest continuously published
student-edited law review. However, the University of Pennsylvania also claims to be the oldest
continuously published law review, tracing back to the American Law Register in 1851. See William 0.
Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228 n.3 (1965); see also Swygert
& Bruce, supra note 13, at 757, 763.
30. See Notes, I HARv. L. REV. 35, 35 (1887).
31. See id.
32. See John Wigrnore, The Recent Cases Department, 50 HARv. L. REV. 862, 862 (1937).
33. Notes, supra note 30, at 35.
34. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 779 (citing Maggs, supra note 7, at 181-83).
35. See id.
36. See id. Northwestern's law review originated in 1906.
37. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 785 (citing Frederic D. Woodward, Editorial Notes, 1
ILL. L. REV. 39, 39 (1906)).
38. See id. The periodical, originally published by Northwestern, ended up a joint effort between
the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois, and Northwestern University. See A.K., Editorial
Note, The Law Review, 21 ILL. L. REV. 147, 153 (1926). It was initially published by Northwestern
alone.
1998]
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widespread need of a live periodical primarily devoted to the discussion
and exposition of Illinois law, and other matters of special practical value
to the Illinoi3 bar. In that belief, and with the purpose of supplying that
need, this Review is launched. 9
The purpose of the Illinois Law Review was, from the first issue, to enter into a
dialogue with the [llinois bar."
Despite the success of these early journals, the utility of the increasing number of
"smaller journals" was a contested issue. In 1936, the Virginia Law Review published
an article arguing "that there is a definite need and definite place for the smaller law
review.""' The article realistically defined the purpose and goals of such a journal:
But the editor of such a review should realize that his task is a peculiarly
individual one and that it is not the imitation, on a lesser scale, of the
older journals, whose place as "national" reviews is established. He
should realize that the value of his review does not depend on its being
national in scope, but that its function is rather to supply a need which
the large reviews cannot meet.
These, because they are so widely read, cannot confine themselves to
a study of the law of any one state, but must publish material which is
of general interest to attorneys and jurists throughout the nation .... It
should, especially if only recently established, specialize to a con-
siderable extent in the law of the state where it is published. By so
doing, it may easily become more valuable to the people in its state than
a legal periodical of national scope.
Attorneys and judges would find particularly helpful a law review
which place:3 emphasis upon the law of the state where they are
practicing or presiding!2
Further, the article gave six suggestions for focusing law review material toward
state practitioners:
(1) "One issue or part of an issue may be devoted to a review of the state supreme
court decisions.. .,43
(2) "Similarly, a review of new state legislation is of general interest to the people
of the state."'
(3) "Before the ;tate legislature convenes, the law review may offer suggestions
for changes in the laws or the adoption of new ones.9
45
39. Woodward, supra note 37, at 39.
40. See id.; see also Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 785; Hibbitts, supra note 25, at 623 n.33
(citing Editors' Note, I S. L.Q. 45, 45 (1916) (Tulane Law School), Editors' Note, I W. RES. L.J. 18, 18-
19 (1895), Introductory, 1 COUNSELLOR 16 (1891) (New York Law School), and Notes, supra note 30,
at 35, as law reviews with a goal of aiding practitioners).
41. Joseph G. Werner, The Need for "State" Reviews, 23 VA. L. R v. 49, 49 (1936).
42. Id.
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(4) "[Ilnterpret the restatements of law with regard to the particular state in which
they are located."'
(5) "The leading articles may be confined more. or less to problems in which the
members of the state bar are interested.
47
(6) "Along with the review of the state supreme court decisions suggested above,
the student notes and comments should place emphasis upon the important recent
state cases, with pertinent criticisms.
'"4
In addition, the article suggested that "[i]n states where there is more than one law
review, the editorial boards should reach some agreement whereby each would
specialize in certain fields of law," or that some other apportionment be made in
order to review thoroughly and effectively state law without duplication4 The
article, however, noted that, "[o]f course, the fact that a journal becomes specialized
in reviewing the law of its own state does not mean that the law of the other forty-
seven states and of the federal courts should be entirely ignored.""0 These sugges-
tions from the past are arguably a guide to scholarship that is more responsive to the
needs of judges and practitioners.
B. The First Citations by the Courts
Despite their growing number, law reviews would not be regarded as a legitimate
persuasive authority until the United States Supreme Court was willing to recognize
their contribution to the law. Building on its tradition of citing treatises, The Supreme
Court cited its first law review article in 1896." In United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n," Justice Edward White, dissenting, cited a Harvard Law Review
article that dealt with the law of contracts, entitled On Contract and Restraint of
Trade." Three years later in Chicago, 'Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v.
Clark,' Chief Justice Fuller, this time in the majority opinion of the court, cited
another Harvard Law Review article that dealt with the doctrine of considertion.
The court noted the following:
[O]n the principle that where a liquidated sum is due, the payment of a
less sum in satisfaction thereof, though accepted as satisfaction, is not
binding as such for want of consideration. Cumber v. Wane, 1 Strange,
46. Id. at 51.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Il at 52.
50. ld.
51. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 788. Swygert's article contained its own survey to
determine the first citations by the Supreme Court. See id. at 788 n.408. Whether or not the citations
addressed are in fact the first citations by the Supreme Court has not been verified.
52. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
53. See id. at 350 n.1 (citing Amasa M. Eaton, On Contracts and Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 128, 129 (1890)).
54. 178 U.S. 353 (1900).
55. See id. at 365 (citing James Barr Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARv. L. REV. 515,
521 (1899)).
1998]
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426. The rule therein laid down has been much questioned and qualified.
Goddard v. O'Brien, 9 Q.B. Div. 37; Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23;
Couldery v. IBartrum, 19 Ch. D. 394; Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605;
Notes to Cumber v. Wane in Smith's Leading Cases, vol. 1, 606; 12
Harvard Law Review, 521.'
Overcoming their initial prejudice, courts sought out law reviews to assist in their
judicial decision making, and from the beginning, courts cited articles that had been
tailored to address the legal problems before them. In many cases, such articles have
had a tangible impact on the law as a result of their citation by a court. One of the
first examples of such an article was a doctrinal piece written by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis titled The Right to PrivacyY The article, which ultimately
influenced a change in the law, appeared in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.58
Warren and Brandeis proposed a change in the privacy doctrine, suggesting the
existence of a common-law right to privacy and a tort for its invasion before the
courts had recognized such a right.' The article focused on existing tort law,
addressing the issue of whether the law of torts provided a right to privacy, an issue
that had been highlighted in a "somewhat notorious" case brought before a New York
trial court a few months before the article was published.' After laying out the
history of applicable tort doctrine' the article stated that, "[i]t is our purpose to
consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked
to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of
such protection is."
'"2
In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,' the New York Court of Appeals
rejected the notion of a common-law right to privacy." The four-judge majority
opinion, citing Warren's and Brandeis's article, stated:
Nevertheless [the trial court] reached the conclusion that plaintiff had a
good cause of action against defendants, in that defendants had invaded
what is called a "right to privacy"; in other words, the right to be let
56. Ia (emphasis added).
57. See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 13, at 787-89 (discussing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890)).
58. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57.
59. See id. at 195-95.
60. See id. at 195. 'The Warren and Brandeis article was written in response to Manola V. Stevens
& Myers, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 18, 21, 1890 (N.Y. Sup. Court 1890). See id. at 195 n.7. The plaintiff
alleged that while performing in the Broadway Theater, a role that required her appearance in tights, she
was, by means of a flash light, photographed surreptitiously and without her consent by the defendant.
The plaintiff prayed defendant be restrained from using the photograph. See id. An ex parte preliminary
injunction was issued and the issue of permanently enjoining the defendant was set for argument;
however, no one showed up on behalf of the defendant at the hearing to oppose the motion. See id.
61. See id. at 193-94 (discussing the history and law of battery, assault, nuisance, and alienation of
affection).
62. Id. at 197.
63. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
64. See id. at 443.
[Vol. 51:659
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alone. Mention of such a right is not to be found in Blackstone, Kent,
or any other of the great commentators upon the law; nor so far as the
learning of counsel or the courts in this case have been able to discover,
does its existence seem to have been asserted prior to about the year
1890, when it was presented with attractiveness, and no inconsiderable
ability, in the Harvard Law Review (volume 4, p. 193) in an article
entitled "Rights of a Citizen to His Reputation."'
Once their initial prejudice had subsided, courts began to seek out law review
articles dealing with the legal issues of the day to assist in their judicial decisions.
These articles often shaped the law. Despite losing the battle in the New York Court
of Appeals, Brandeis and Warren to a certain degree won the war as subsequently,
the New York legislature established a statutory right to privacy. Today, both the
privacy right and the article have won wide recognition: William Prosser described
the article as an "outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the
American law."'67
III. Judges & Practitioners v. Academia: The Great
Debate Over Legal Scholarship
Practitioners and judges are concerned about what they perceive to be a lack of
scholarship addressed toward their needs and believe that much of the modem legal
scholarship is directed toward academicians. For example, the American Bar
Association's McCrate Report, an educational study focusing on legal education
and the practice of law, observed that "[p]ractitioners tend to view much academic
scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day concerns .. . ."' It further
noted that practitioners "believe law professors are more interested in pursuing their
own intellectual interests than in helping the legal profession address matters of
important current concern."7 In response to these impractical articles, practitioners
have asked law reviews to consider their needs when choosing article topics.
Over the last thirty years, clinical education has grown significantly in an attempt
to bridge the perceived gap between practitioners and academics. Simultaneously, the
increase in narrowly tailored, theoretical, conceptual, and interdisciplinary legal
65. Id.
66. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L. REy. 383, 385 (1960). The statute enacted by the
New York legislature made it both a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name, portrait, or picture
of any person for "advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade" without written consent. See id
(referring to what is now N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999)).
67. Id. at 383; see also JOHN E. NOWAK Er AL., CONSTrTIONAL LAW 795-96 (5th ed. 1995).
68. Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Professional Develop-
ment - An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR
[hereinafter McCrate Report] (chaired by Robert McCrate). The McCrate Report attempted to bridge the
gap between legal educators and practicing lawyers and to "recognize that they are engaged in a common
enterprise - the education and professional development of the members of a great profession." Id. at
3.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id.
1998]
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scholarship has served to fuel the controversy. Most notably, critics of modem legal
scholarship observe that the critical legal studies (CLS) movement and its predeces-
sors that began in the 1970s have overwhelmed traditional, doctrinal legal scholar-
ship. In the eyes of practitioners and judges, the debate is framed in terms of
practical legal scholarship versus impractical legal scholarship.7' However, if law
reviews are to respond to practitioners and judges, it is important to define precisely
what is meant by practical and impractical.
Generally, what judges and practitioners are asking for is embodied in the
definition of practical scholarship proposed by Judge Edwards of the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Practical scholarship "analyzes the law and
legal system with an aim to instruct attorneys in their consideration of legal
problems; to guide judges and other decision-makers in their resolution of legal
disputes; and [as a secondary role,] to advise legislators and other policymakers on
law reform."'  Tha practical article must attend to the various sources of law,
placing emphasis on cases, statutes, and other authoritative texts." Further, practical
scholarship may employ theory74 to criticize doctrine, to resolve the problems that
doctrine leaves opn, and to propose changes in the law or systems of justice. 5
Practical scholarship, however, does not have to be "wholly doctrinal" and should
include a "healthy balance of theory and doctrine."'7
Conversely, impractical scholarship is legal scholarship that practitioners and
judges feel is abstract and has little relevance to concrete issues before the courts.'
Impractical scholarship can be purely doctrinal, but it is equally considered
impractical if it addresses a narrowly focused and obscure area of the law.7 More
often, however, critics of modem scholarship such as Judge Edwards point to the
scholarship that has developed since the 1970s on such topics as law and economics,
legal history, law and literature, law and sociology, and various other "law and"
movements.' In sum, impractical scholarship can be doctrinal. Most often,
however, it is modem interdisciplinary scholarship that looks at the law from the
outside, using the tools of social science to advocate legal reform.
71. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 35-38 (1992) (discussing practical versus impractical
scholarship). Others refer to "old" legal scholarship as directed to judges and practitioners and "new"
legal scholarship as schilarship that "strays away from the law as a source of values and methodology."
Peter A. Joy, Clinical Scholarship: Improving the Practice of Law, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 385, 388 n.21
(1996) (comparing Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89
MICH. L. REv. 792, 802, 809, 820 (1991) and David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEtAV. Sci. & L. 17, 18-19 (1993), with Francis A.
Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects, 43 J. LEGAL EDuc. 403, 404 (1993)).
72. See Edwards, rupra note 71, at 42-43.
73. See id. at 43.
74. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
75. See Edwards, ,-upra note 71, at 43.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 35.
78. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
79. See Edwards, supra note 71, at 34-35.
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In some contexts, judges and practitioners refer to impractical scholarship as
"theoretical." Practitioners and judges believe that practical legal scholarship is
scholarship that centers on doctrine, and they criticize as "theoretical" scholarship that
does not have an accepted legal doctrine as its foundation. That is not to say that
practitioners and judges believe legal scholarship should not include theory. As early
as 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes said, "[tiheory is the most important part of the
dogma of the law ... [i]t is not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the competent, it
simply means going to the bottom of the subject."' However, the American
Heritage Dictionary's definition of "theory" notes, among other things, that theory is
"a system of assumptions, accepted principles, and rules of procedure devised to
analyze, predict, or otherwise explain the nature or behavior of a specified set of
phenomena."'" Practitioners and judges, in their criticisms of law reviews, do not
seem to condemn theory to the extent it explains phenomena in the law. However,
they do appear to condemn many of the principles on which much modem legal
scholarship is founded because they feel that those principles are not accepted.'
The disjunction among practitioners, judges, and academics appears to be a
philosophical difference in their jurisprudential theories. Practitioners' cries for
"practical" scholarship reinforce the idea that judges and practitioners, including many
who were trained during the era of legal realism, believe that the great mass of law
is settled and that there is only a fringe of hard cases where it is useful for lawyers
to have familiarity with tools other than doctrine.' Therefore, practitioners and
80. O.W. [Oliver Wendell] Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
81. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1861 (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis
added).
82. The conflict between theory and practice is not a new phenomenon.
Many great philosophers have focused on the nature of theory and practice, and the
relationship between the two. Classical philosophers such as Aristotle distinguished
theoretical inquiry, the study of truth for its own sake, from either productive or practical
inquiry, and regarded pure theory as the highest and purest form of knowledge.
Jean R. Sterlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence
of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 716-17 (1996).
83. The difference in jurisprudential theories between practitioners and scholars was suggested and
explained by Robert W. Gordon, Professor of Law at Stanford University. See Gordon, supra note 86,
at 2077. Professor Gordon explains the root jurisprudential theories behind what many judges and prac-
titioners think. See id His focus is on the specific jurisprudence behind Judge Harry Edward's idea of
"practical" scholarship, which is discussed in this article. See id.
Judge Edwards is taking up a strong position on greatly disputed issues of jurisprudence.
His jurisprudence is central to his thesis because it defines the scope of what he considers
"relevant" and "practical" contributions from scholars. His position depends on a
conception of the judge as primarily a law-declarer and only marginally and incrementally
a policymaker.... To work in the fringe areas, it is useful for lawyers to have some
familiarity with "theory" and "policy" and the ability to argue from them. But this set of
skills is distinctly secondary because it is "practical" only in a very limited set of contexts,
the ten percent involving argument over "hard cases." [lit follows from this ... that the
core legal activity ... of scholars should be to help judges, and lawyers arguing before
them, to "find" existing law ... addressf[ some specific knotty doctrinal problem that is
already, or soon likely to be, before the courts; or, even better... [to write a] treatise
devoted to encyclopedic exposition of all the doctrine in some legal field.
1998]
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judges believe that legal scholarship and "the main business of legal scholars should
be to help judges, and lawyers arguing before them to 'find' the existing law" and
present it "in the conventional form of judicial-doctrinal discourse."" Even
advocates of modem legal scholarship admit, at least in part, that this traditional
common law-based jurisprudence remains the "official" view.
[This] view of legal reasoning is undoubtedly widespread in our legal
culture. It still seems to be the official view, in the sense that judges and
lawyers arguing before judges feel constrained to talk as if it were true.
It is reflected in the distinction one often hears made between "legal" and
"policy" arguments. But it is hardly the only view around.5
The other side of the debate is founded on legal realism.' Embracing legal
realism, many academics, and some practitioners influenced by legal realism, argue
that although doctrine supplies the language of legal decision making, it is not a
major factor in deciding cases. What judges do is influenced by something else"
- often believed to be largely political' - and therefore, it is the study of this
"something else"' that is of the greatest utility. Such insights, it is argued, can be
a valuable tool to a practitioner.'
Moreover, "[o]utside the restricted area of practice before the courts, which is only
a small part of what actors in our legal system do, doctrine is even less useful."'"
While these articles may be labeled impractical by lawyers who are looking for
material to add to a brief or by a judge looking for authority to cite in an opinion,
the scholarship is arguably of great utility in changing societal norms and reforming
the overall politicad structure on which the legal system is supported.'
A. The Practicing Bar's Observations
Law review articles are replete with the pleas of judges and practitioners for
articles tailored to address the issues they face on a daily basis. Judges and
practitioners (and some legal scholars) have criticized what they. perceive to be the
increasing lack of traditional, doctrinal legal scholarship. One of their primary
Id. at 2077-78
84. .1d at 2078.
85. Id. (emphasis added). The purpose of this note is not to suggest that only scholarship centering
on doctrine should be produced. Formalism in law reviews should be rejected, and they should be the
breeding ground of new ideas and new types of scholarship. However, doctrine is not an impoverished
subject,.and it continues to be the mainstay of the legal profession.
86. See Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075,
2078 (1993).
87. See generally Karl N. lewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236-37 (1931).
88. See generally Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1982).
89. See generally id.
90. See infra notes 116, 120-23 and accompanying text.
91. Gordon, supra note 86, at 2078.
92. See infra note 125-30 and accompanying text.
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criticisms is that academics are writing for other academics rather than directing
scholarship toward the bar.
Practitioners and judges have joined academics in criticizing legal
scholarship as too ethereal. Many have noted that law review articles are
frequently directed toward an audience consisting of a very small number
of legal academics in the author's own specialty area, rather than toward
an audience of practitioners, judges or policymakers."
The following quip from John Mortimer's British television series Rumpole of the
Bailey, dialoging an encounter between an "eminent law professor" and an "eminent
practitioner," embodies the discordant feelings between academia and the bar. Upon
meeting the practitioner, the professor inquires:
"What do you think of academic lawyers down at the Old Bailey?" The
practitioner replies, "Well to tell you the truth .... we hardly think of
them at all." The Oxford law don then goes on to inquire: "but you'll
have read my paper on 'The Concept of Constructive Intent and Mens
Rea in Murder and Manslaughter' in The Harvard Law Review?" "Oh
rather," lied the practitioner, "Your average East End Jury finds it
absolutely riveting. '
Judges, a unique form of practitioners, have been the loudest critics of modem
legal scholarship, with articles like the Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession." In that article, Judge Edwards agrees that modem legal
scholarship is often directed at a very small group, and that the group is generally
made up of academics rather than practitioners and judges." Specifically, his
criticisms are that he has been unable to find law review articles that bear directly
on the issues that his court faces on a daily basis.' Rather, he finds far too much
"impractical" scholarship - usually theoretical, interdisciplinary ("law and") or
critical work - which is of little or no help to practitioners." The articles either do
not address any legal problem they must resolve, or they address legal problems but
use resources other than authoritative legal materials to resolve them."
93. Sternlight, supra note 82, at 734. The article cites the McCrate Report, which states:
Practitioners tend to view much academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their
day-to-day concerns, particularly when compared with the great treatises of an earlier era.
It is not surprising that many practicing lawyers believe law professors are more interested
in pursuing their own intellectual interests than in helping the legal profession address
matters of important current concern.
Id. at 734 n.147 (quoting McCrate Report, supra note 68, at 5).
94. Id at 734 n.147 (quoting Talbot D'Alemberte, Keynote Address, McCrate Report Conference
Proceeding (Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1993)).
95. Edwards, supra note 71.
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Judge Edwards is not the only judge to observe that there is less traditional,
doctrinal legal scholarship. Judge Richard Posner, a leading practitioner of modem
interdisciplinary scholarship, has also noted the decline in traditional scholarship.
The doctrinalists - the traditionalists in academic law - thus are being
crowded by economic analysts of law, by other social scientists of law,
by Bayesians, by philosophers of law, by critical legal scholars, by
feminists and by gay legal scholars, by the law and literature crowd and
by critical race theorists, all deploying the tools of nonlegal disci-
plines." °
Further, Judge Posner notes that "fine doctrinal work" continues to be produced,
however, it is produced at a "diminished fraction" as law faculties now generate a
"formidable quantity" of scholarship intended to be read by other scholars rather than
by lawyers or judges."0 '
In a speech to the members of the Whittier Law Review, Justice Frank K. Richardson
of the Supreme Court of California described the plight of the practitioner searching for
more doctrinal woik. He opened his speech by praising the work of law reviews,
stating, "I am here this evening to tip my hat to the law reviews of the country for
quietly providing the light which helps keep the common law on the right trail."' In
closing his speech, however, Justice Richardson added a personal observation from his
days as a practitioner:
I have spent three-fourths of my professional career as a private sole
practitioner.., almost entirely on the civil side .... I subscribed to two
law reviews ... and would examine them for useful, practical help. I
was invariably impressed with the scholarship and penetrating in-depth
analysis of the authors appearing in the law reviews, but I rarely gained
much practical assistance from pursuing them . . . . I could scan an
article on the "Commercial Aspects of the Indian-Pakistani Trade
100. Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1647, 1651 (1993). Judge
Posner is a supporter of modem interdisciplinary scholarship and was a pioneer in the application of law
and economics. See id. Judge Posner observes that:
[ilnterdisciplinary legal scholars often are not trained in the fields that they wish to bring
to bear on the law; often they are not trained for any sort of scholarship except the
doctrinal scholarship on which they, perhaps for excellent reasons, have turned their
backs. Few American law professors have a graduate degree in law or in anything else.
They have the same legal training as practitioners.
Id. at 1656. For this reason, Judge Posner believes that a great portion of interdisciplinary work is
mediocre and suggests a restructuring of the legal education process to include specific education in
interdisciplinary work ,t a graduate level. See id.
101. Id at 1655. Others have noted that legal scholars are writing for each other. See, e.g., Edwards,
supra note 71, at 36; Gordon, supra note 86, at 2096; Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic
Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 320 (1989); Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade:
Appellate Judge's View of Practice Oriented Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL EDuC. 35,42 (1986) (noting
that few law review articles prove helpful in appellate decision making).
102. Frank K. Richardson, Law Reviews and the Courts, 5 WHrI'ER L. REV. 385, 386 (1983).
Frank K. Richardson is an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of California.
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Treaty," including all 109 footnotes, and not get much comfort.... My
review of "Regional Planning and Economic Dispersal Programs in Great
Britain" gave me no comfort as I faced tomorrow's probate calendar, or
a jury selection, or the preparation of interrogatories .... The point I
am making is that in your selection of materials do not forget the little
guy who can periodically use some help in the day-to-day, practical,
bread and butter responsibilities of his practice."
Practitioners as well as judges continue to ask law reviews to produce more
traditional scholarship tailored toward their needs. If legal scholars do not respond,
these criticisms may mark the solidification of the prejudice that prevented judges
from considering law review articles as persuasive secondary authority. 4
In addition to practitioners and judges, some academics agree that a great deal of
scholarship being produced today is impractical. They believe that impractical
scholarship has added to the discord between the bar and academia. At a conference
on law journals sponsored by the Stanford Law Review in 1995, Robert Pitofsky,
professor and former dean at Georgetown University, now a commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission, summarized recent criticisms by noting that legal
scholarship "is increasingly theoretical, impractical, esoteric, [and] spuriously
scientific."' 5 Pitofsky believes there is a contrast between today's legal scholarship,
in which academics reject the opportunity to influence real world decisions in order
to maintain purity of vision, with "the scholarship of yesteryear," in which scholars
sought to play a real world role."l
Like practitioners and judges, academicians similarly note that a great deal of legal
scholarship being produced today addresses areas of doctrine that are far too
103. ld. at 391-92.
104. While practitioners and judges complain that there is not enough scholarship tailored to their
needs, law reviews have received other criticism from the judiciary. Justice Holmes at one time
admonished counsel who referred to a law review article in his oral argument, stating that such articles
were the "work of boys." Charles E. Hughes, Foreword, 50 YALE L.J. 737, 737 (1941). Much of this
animosity may stem from the critical review many judges have received in the pages of law reviews. See
id. Such criticism has prompted some judges, when asked how to improve law reviews, to suggest,
"write only flattering things about judges' opinions ... [and] if an opinion reaches the wrong result,
instead of immortalizing it as myopic or blundering, why not describe it as thought-provoking or
interesting?" Kaye, supra note 101, at 314. This, however, may not be the most constructive criticism.
Of course, judges have not cornered the market on criticism that may not be constructive. See Fred
Rodel, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1936). Professor Rodel stated, "There are two
things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its style. The other is its content." Id.
105. McCrate Report, supra note 68, at 202.
106. See id.; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 204-05 (1994) (noting
that many articles will be read by no one at all, other than the writer's promotion and tenure committee);
John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the
Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343, 343 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance,
70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 918 (1986) (claiming current scholarship places emphasis on clever, highly
counter-intuitive theories at the expense of common sense); John E. Nowak, Woe unto You, Law
Reviews!, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 317, 320 (1985) (stating that the way to become a successful professor is
to "[t]ake an obscure little problem that no one has thought much about, blow it all out of proportion,
and solve it, preferably several times, in prestigious law reviews").
1998]
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obscure."°  For example, Professor Kenneth Lasson, a professor of law at the
University of Baltimore, observed the following:
The lead articles themselves are often overwhelming collections of
minutiae, perhaps substantively relevant at some point in time to an
individual practitioner or two way out in the hinterlands - and that
almost entirely by chance. Otherwise they are relegated to oblivion, or
if lucky to a passing but see in someone else's obscure piece.
True (and perhaps good), law today pervades all aspects of life - but
must all aspects of life be treated in law reviews? Here's a sampling of
recent articles:
- The Unrecognized Uses of Legal Education in Papua New
Guinea
- The Legal Status of Fish Farming
- Epistemological Foundations and Meta-Hermeneutic Methods:
The Search for a Theoretical Justification of the Coercive
Force of Legal Interpretation
- If Spot Bites the Neighbor, Should Dick and Jane Go to Jail?
- Judicial Review: From the Frog to Mickey Mouse
- What's Love Got to Do With It? Critical Legal Studies,
Feminist Discourse, and the Ethic of Solidarity
- Morality or Sittlichkeit: Toward a Post-Hegelian Solution
- Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture
- Toward an Economic Theory of Voluntary Resignation by
Dictators
- The Differentiation of Francophone Rapists and Nonrapists
Using Penile Circumferential Measures
- Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?
Why, indeed."m
107. See Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103
HARv. L. REv. 926 (1990).
108. lId at 930. Along with practitioners and judges, students apparently are interested for the most
part in doctrine. However, their definition of doctrine may be misguided.
Most law students ... always want more "doctrinal" education, though their view of
doctrine is not the same.... What they want is more "black-letter" law - that is, clear
and well-organized presentation of rules in the style of the well-taught bar review cram
course. This "doctrinal education" we do not need. [Students must be taught] that just
learning rules is of limited use; that one has to learn also how to select the right rule for
a case among conflicting rules, to apply rules to facts, to interpret rules and factual
narratives and to argue contrary interpretations; and that these skills in turn require some
grasp of principles, policies, and the importance of contextual variations.
Gordon, supra note 8.5, at 2107-08. In a footnote, Professor Gordon notes a further phenomenon.
The minute that a teacher launches a discussion of theory, policy, ethics, or social contest
that is not immediately and closely tied to resolving a case situation, most of the students
tune out and put down their pens.... My impression is confirmed by a recent study of
Harvard Law students. See generally Robert Grandfield, Making Elite Lawyers (1992).
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While judges have been some of the loudest critics, they have also expressed a
desire to consult and utilize law review articles. Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes
expressed his belief that "it is not too much to say that, in confronting any serious
problem, a wide-awake judge and careful judge will at once look to see if the subject
has been discussed, or the authorities collated and analyzed, in a good law
periodical."'" More recently, Justice William 0. Douglas, himself a former law
professor, stated, "I have a special affection for law reviews, as I was an editor at
Columbia (1924-1925), and I have drawn heavily from them for ideas and guidance
as practitioner, teacher, and as judge.... Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that law
review articles and comments are "indispensable professional tools..."
In addition to the federal judiciary, state court judges have expressed an interest
in law reviews. Justice Frank K Richardson stated the following:
Contrary to what you may think, judges read law reviews, very
selectively. The very proliferation of appellate opinion writing in the
United States forces the average jurist very often to rely on secondary
sources. When a judge can find an applicable law review article, he has
discovered a jewel, a very useful tool, a light on the trail, a signpost on
the path."'
Justice Richardson further suggested that law reviews may shape the law in an even
more concrete way, as the modem version of special masters, commissioners or
assessors who, near the turn of the century, advised and assisted courts in making
determinations of fact."
3
Id. at 2108 n.81. Of further interest, Professor Gordon has observed that not all students have this
reaction.
The Federalists seem totally aware of the practical utility of building a worldview out of
history, political theory, and economics and legal theory that in turn will inform their
views of practice and their reform agenda as lawyers. By contrast some of my more left-
wing students, to my considerable distress, refuse to see how useful theory could be to
their causes, reject it as elitist garbage, and view anecdote, autobiography and polemic as
sufficient substitutes.
Id. at 2108.
109. Hughes, supra note 104.
110. William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH L. REv. 227, 227 (1965).
111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. Richardson, supra note 102, at 388.
113. See Crowell v. Benson, 52 S. Ct. 285, 292-93 (1932). In Crowell, Chief Justice Hughes stated
in the majority opinion:
There is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial
power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges.... In
cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic practice to call to the assistance of the courts,
without the consent of the parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors, to pass upon
certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account or to find the
amount of damages. While the reports of masters and commissioners in such cases are
essentially of an advisory nature, it has not been the practice to disturb their findings
when they are properly based upon evidence, in the absence of errors of law.
1998]
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[L]aw reviews perform an invaluable service for courts when, with
resources that are unavailable to courts, [reviews perform] . .. practical
field studies, they assemble statistical information, qualitative analysis,
and legal and constitutional assessments of judicial problems. When
properly documented, the law review in effect becomes, in reality, an
investigative arm of the court, a valuable adjunct to the administration of
justice natiorwide."4
Arguably the strongest judicial endorsement of law reviews has come from Chief
Justice Earl Warren. Chief Justice Warren, in an address at the University of
Southern California Law Review's annual banquet in 1952, stated:
The American law review properly has been called the most remarkable
institution of the law school world. To a lawyer, its articles and com-
ments may be indispensable professional tools. To a judge.. . the review
may be bot a severe critic and a helpful guide. But perhaps most
important, the review affords invaluable training to the students ...
B. Academia's Perspective
Despite much criticism and controversy, modem scholarship has many supporters
who do not believe it is impractical. Its defenders, however, focus for the most part
on the controversial interdisciplinary scholarship, referred to as "theoretical""16 by
judges and practitioners, arguing that it is a justifiable area of legal study. Defenders
of "theory" generally justify interdisciplinary scholarship for its ability to explain the
legal system, to increase the morality of students and practitioners, and to assist
practitioners and judges in their real world legal decisions."7 Of note, few if any
defenders of modern legal scholarship profess the utility or value of narrowly tailored
doctrinal scholarship that addresses obscure areas of the law - scholarship that
practitioners and judges similarly condemn as impractical.
In direct contrast to judges and practitioners, supporters of interdisciplinary
scholarship view it much the way Holmes described, as a tool for the competent
practitioner to get to the bottom of the subject. They attempt to persuade judges and
practitioners that this type of scholarship is practical. For example, J. Cunyon
114. Richardson, supra note 102, at 389. In a series of cases involving the California Mentally
Disordered Sex Offenders law, the California Supreme Court relied heavily on a symposium of the
University of Santa Clara that addressed the issue and presented an empirical study of medical and
penological data. See id. (discussing People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1975) and People v. Feagley,
535 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1975)). The court took judicial notice of the material because it "had been carefully
checked, prepared and assessed by experts, and having been published was subject to whatever
professional criticism was indicated." Id. (emphasis added).
115. Earl Warren, Messages of Greeting to the UCLA Law Review, 1 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1953).
116. See supra note 80-82 and accompanying text.
117. See Stemligh:, supra note 82, at 736 (noting that there are other justification for theory); see
also Paul Brest, Plts Ca Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1993) (stating it is important to expand legal
knowledge and thought for their own sake); Paul D. Reingold, Harry Edwards' Nostalgia, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 1998, 1999 (1993) (arguing that theory describes complex norms).
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Gordon, a former member of the United States Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps
and current litigation partner at Jenner & Block in Chicago, suggests that "outsider"
theoretical scholars, such as feminists and critical race theorists, are of the most
assistance to her as a practitioner, in that the heavy doctrinal education promotes the
existing establishment, whereas the outsider scholarship can be used to critique the
establishment and argue for changes in the law. '18 Others, such as Jean R.
Sternlight, an assistant professor at Florida State University College of Law, argue
that the various "law and" theories are valuable tools to both legislators and
practitioners."9 In a recent article, Sternlight demonstrates how critical legal studies,
law and economics, and feminist jurisprudence can be directly applied by lobbyists
to the "real world" issue of whether newborn children should be subjected to
mandatory, nonanonymous testing for HIV." Further, she demonstrates how these
areas of legal study could provide insights to an attorney regarding the
constitutionality of such a law.'
Similarly, Professor Robert Gordon of Stanford University points out how the "law
and economics" movement is very practical."
I must admit my jaw dropped when I came to the part of Judge
Edwards' article that seems to argue that even law and economics is not
"practical." . . . President Reagan's executive orders required all the
agencies to do "cost-benefit" analyses; the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department incorporated Chicago School antitrust theory in its
guidelines; environmental agencies shifted away from command-and-
control regulation to economic-incentive-based standards; deregulation
118. See J. Cunyon Gordon, A Response from the Visitor from Another Planet, 91 MIcH. L. REv.
1953, 1961-62 (1993).
119. See Stemlight, supra note 82, at 736-67.
120. See id.; see also Edward A. Bernstein, Law and Economics and the Structure of Value Adding
Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189 (1995)
(arguing that law and economics literature is useful to practitioners). Bernstein states that:
[t]mditionally, practicing lawyers have ignored the law and economics literature most
likely because it focuses primarily on how legal rules can be used to improve social
welfare rather than on how to serve the interests of clients.... [S]cholars would better
serve the practicing bar by directly addressing issues confronting contract lawyers,
[however] the existing literature, if viewed from the perspective of a contract lawyer, can
be used to analyze and formalize general principles practicing contract lawyers routinely
apply to structure value increasing executory contracts and to effectively allocate
transactional risks.
Id. at 189-90.
121. See Sternlight, supra note 82, at 753. However, her insights seem more political than legal.
The first half of Professor Sternlight's example focuses on the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 754.
In addition to arguing that the government does not have a compelling governmental interest, she argues
that an attorney practically applying CLS would support her position with policy arguments that would
be made by a lobbyist opposing the law. See id. The second half of the explanation centers on how a
"politicized" attorney may act as a lobbyist and organize a political opposition to the legislation, focusing
on the adverse impact on African Americans, Hispanics, and poor members of our society, that would
likely be caused by mandatory testing. See id.
122. See Gordon, supra note 86, at 2083-84.
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statutes shifted traditional regulated industries like trucking and airlines
out of regulation entirely in market regimes; the Bureau of Economics
and the Federal Trade Commission seized power from the Bureau of
Consumer Protection; tort reforms premised on economic analysis were
widely proposed, as were "cafeteria" plans of educational and health
providers competing with one another other for consumer votes, and still
other plans to privatize virtually every remaining public function.
Leading law-and-economics scholars where elevated to the federal bench
and administrative agencies, which they found very congenial platforms
for the application of their theories."
In contrast to many academics who argue that modern scholarship is practical,
many defenders of interdisciplinary scholarship acknowledge that their work is of no
practical value to practitioners and judges, but support the scholarship on moral and
educational grounds. In fact, many academics admit openly that much of the modem
interdisciplinary scholarship is of little use to judges and practitioners, and are
satisfied with that development. At least one (anonymous) academic scholar admits
that modem scholaiship does not speak to judges or practitioners and that he or she
has no intention to make any changes regarding publication decisions:
Though I am always delighted to discover that a judge has [read]
anything I have written . . .I can honestly say that I [do not] expect
many judicial readers nor am I willing to redirect my writing in ways
likely to increase the number.
... I view my task as a legal academic as similar more to the member
of a university department of religion somewhat detached from the
practices he/she is studying.., one need not be devotee of a particular
religion in order to find its practices or doctrines fascinating."u
One legitimate explanation for why academics may not write articles for prac-
titioners and judges is that they view interdisciplinary scholarship as a tool to critique
and serve society, creating a higher level of morality in practitioners and influencing
policy changes that need to be made in the law. Emma Jordan of the Georgetown
University Law Center, a former president of the Association of American Law
Schools, believes interdisciplinary scholarship is a valuable tool to critique our social
and legal structures." "ITihe newly emerging genres of critical race legal theory
and feminist legal theory offer a window of intellectual opportunity, through which
lawyers can begin to reimagine a just and fair society.""* Bryant Garth, dean and
professor at the Indiana University School of Law, argues that law schools should
123. See Gordon, supra note 86, at 2084; see also Bernstein, supra note 116, 120, at 189-90
(discussing how law and economics principles can be used by practicing contract lawyers, but noting that
"scholars would better serve the practicing bar by directly addressing issues confronting contract
lawyers').
124. Edwards, supra note 71, at 36 (letter on file in chambers).
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teach future lawyers to be guided by morality, and that interdisciplinary scholarship
is the way to achieve this end." Many feel that the efforts of critical legal scholars
and others doing "law and" work may be the only hope for making the legal
profession "honorable.""n
Interdisciplinary scholarship has been praised for its ability to provide insight into
existing legal systems. Yale Law School Professor George Priest argues that the legal
system can best be understood by employing the methods and theories of the social
sciences.'" Professor Priest says, "It follows from this view, however, that one
must abandon the notion that law is a subject that can be usefully studied by persons
trained only in the law."''
These beneficial uses of interdisciplinary scholarship have caused many supporters
to propose changes to law school curricula. Judge Posner, one of the original
practitioners of the law and economics movement, believes that law school curricula
should evolve to include specialized education in fields of study other than legal
doctrine.'3'
The law schools need to encourage the branch of academic law that I
call "Legal Theory... ." By Legal Theory, I mean the study of the law
not as a means of acquiring conventional professional competence but
"from the outside," using the methods of scientific and humanistic
inquiry to enlarge our knowledge of the legal system. There should be
departments of law, where students can pursue doctoral programs in
Legal Theory, or alternatively programs that meld college, law school
and doctoral training in another discipline into an integrated course of
study that would take less than the minimum of ten years after high
school that such a program would currently require.'
To be sure, Judge Posner moderates his support by cautioning that he is not
suggesting "that instruction or research in Legal Theory replace doctrinal
analysis." '
More controversially, however, it has been proposed that a hypothetical law school
department, specializing strictly in legal scholarship, would not require a single
127. See Bryant G. Garth, Legal Education and Large Law Firms: Delivering Legality or Solving
Problems, 64 IND. W. 433, 445 (1989); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship
and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 955 (1981) (stating that legal scholarship plays an indispensable
role in the process of moral education).
128. See Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students, as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MiC-. L.
REV. 2025, 2052 (1993).
129. See George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as
University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 437, 437 (1983).
130. Id.
131. Academics have also expressed this view. See, e.g., id. at 441 (predicting approvingly that law
schools will become like graduate schools in social sciences).
132. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 761, 778-79 (1987).
133. Id. at 779.
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individual with legal training. Professor Larry Alexander discussed his proposed legal
scholarship department in the following passage:
[A] department specializing strictly in legal scholarship - if such a
department were warranted - could be staffed solely by economists,
historians, philosophers, and other academics rather than by lawyers.
More precisely, such a legal studies department requires a faculty of
good historians, economists, philosophers, and so forth, but not neces-
sarily good lawyers. Though a J.D. degree can help to acquaint social
scientists and philosophers with doctrine and with the internal par-
ticipant's view of law and its institutions, a legal studies department not
engaged in training lawyers might well have more Ph.D.s relative to
J.D.s on its faculty than most law schools.M
Another, less legitimate, explanation for why academics may not write articles for
practitioners and judges is that they feel the study of doctrine is not an intellectual
pursuit. Professor Mark Tushnet suggests that "something has gone wrong" if legal
scholarship focuse3 on doctrine. He believes that scholarship's obsessive focus on
doctrine relegates t to the margin of serious intellectual activity and contemporary
social thought. 3 Professor Tushnet believes that traditional legal advocacy is so
subjective that a traditional doctrinal article is beyond serious intellectual con-
sideration.
For example, one recent article deals with the constitutionality of
statutes that limit the ability of a defendant accused of rape to examine
aspects of the victim's history. It discusses the Supreme Court's
interpretatior of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and
concludes that some of the statutory limitations are unconstitutional. The
authors treat their conclusions as deductions from the Constitution, but
the legacy cf Realism makes that impossible for serious readers to
accept. Instead, the article must be read, as I suspect it was intended to
be read, as a research aid for lawyers who defend persons accused of
rape, and for the judges before whom those lawyers appear.
Despite intended appearances to the contrary, both case analysis and
policy prescription rely on choices that are not only subjective but
controversial. The dialogue they promote is often intellectually sterile,
because someone else can simply choose another goal and use the same
type of analysis to come to the opposite conclusion. An article that goes
with the crooks is followed by one that goes with the prosecutors; one
that says that corporate responsibility is a problem is answered by one
that says that everything is hunky-dory."
134. Lary Alexander, What We Do, Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1885, 1899 (1993).
135. See Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1205 (1981).
136. Id. at 1210-11. Professor Tushnet asserts that contemporary legal scholarship, the study of "law
as a phenomenon," comes closest to producing a program of research under which justice, defined in
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Professor Tushnet is not alone in his belief.'37
terms other than the rule of law, can be achieved. See id. at 1218.
The study of "law as a phenomenon" centers on the Marxist theory "that all knowledge is a social
product and thus that knowledge can have no transcendent validity." See id. at 1219-20. The problems
highlighted by this approach are the claims to objective knowledge that are shown to be truly subjective
when confronted with the reality that objective knowledge is produced by individuals located inextricably
within the arena about which they are said to have knowledge.
However, Professor Tushnet notes that this type of scholarship will not assist most practitioners, not
because it fails to address issues judges and practitioners face, but rather because few practitioners will
be able to master the technique.
Proselytizers for the . . . [law as a phenomenon] form sometimes argue that it is
professionally valuable. The analytic schemes they develop ... provide useful ways of
organizing a complex body of information, give insights into the kinds of arguments
decision-makers find attractive, and so on. The professionalist defense of the third form
of scholarship is probably valid, but in a rather restricted sense .... Unfortunately, few
professionals have enough talent to master the . . . [traditional] forms and then study
the ... [law as a phenomenon]. Selectivity in law school admissions means that the...
[law as a phenomenon] scholarship will be professionally valuable to a significant con-
centration of students only at the most elite institutions. Although there are inevitably a
few students at every law school who could profit from... [this] form's approaches, the
absence of a group of sufficient size is likely to create pressures at the less elite schools
against following the model used by some scholars at the more elite schools. ... Under
those circumstances, those who produce scholarship of the ... [law as a phenomenon]
form may be seen less as lawyers than as social theorists, economists, or whatever, and
their work may not be seen as "legal" scholarship at all.
Id. at 1219 n.57
137. For example, Jane B. Baron wrote a "biographical" account of her progression away from
traditional doctrine-centered scholarship. See Jane B. Baron, Self-Criticism, 60 TEMPLE LQ. 39 (1987)
(addressing her previous article, Jane B. Baron, The Trust Res and Donative Intent, 61 TUL. L. REv. 45
(1986)). Professor Baron describes how her first article, addressing whether an express trust must have
a res ascertained and arguing that the res requirement functions to defeat rather than to effectuate
donative intent, was no longer correct and in retrospect was not intellectual because it did not address
the issue in a critical manner. See id. at 40.
I confess ... that beginning in my first year of law school I have consistently found
critical legal thought more interesting, more explanatory and more helpful than other
approaches to law. And so it was with great chagrin that on reading my first article,
completed more than eighteen months ago, I found it marginal and wrong in precisely the
senses suggested by Professor Tushnet in 1981.
Id. Professor Baron wrote the article because of "tenure" and at the urging of tenured faculty members
not to write anything controversial. However, she admits that she also chose the topic because she
"wanted people to like the article" and "thought the article was correct." Id.
In reevaluating the article, Professor Baron realized how much the article had taken for granted:
[P]ermitting private individuals to dispose of their own wealth after death involves a
choice that is easily assailed. There is no a priori reason why assets held at death should
not pass to the state for redistribution to the needy, or to the needy directly, or to the
owner's family members to the exclusion of those not related to him by blood. I have no
more interest in defending any of these proposals than I have in defending the current
order.
Id. at 41. A WVestlaw search reveals that Professor Baron's first article has never been cited by a court.
Her biographical account of her first article has similarly never been cited by a court; however, it has
been cited in three law review articles, including one she authored and this article.
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Another scholar, Meir Dan-Cohen, suggests that law professors should not even
attempt to communicate with judges or practitioners because they speak essentially
different languages - practitioners persuade while scholars search for truth.' The
premise of this contention is that practitioners are in the business of persuasion and
their calling is the "strategic" use of the law and language to reach an end for their
clients.'39 In contrast, sincerity is part of the scholar's role. He is guided by the
search for truth and enlightenment, not the strategic goals of clients."m These
differences are, in Dan-Cohen's opinion, "sufficient to dispel any hope or desire for
merging them into . . .a unified system of genuine communication" between
academics, judges and practitioners.'
In spite of the attempts to persuade the bar that "modem" scholarship is practical,
practitioners and judges continue to reject much of the scholarship being produced
today. If academics are unwilling to redirect some of their scholarship, the student-
edited law reviews raay become simply a conversation piece for academics. One sign
that law reviews ar-, losing their authority with the courts is the fact that judicial
citation of law review articles has declined significantly over the past twenty years.
IV. The Survey
A. Methodology
In contrast to previous studies that have focused on the citation of law reviews by
other law journals, or by a single or narrow set of courts,' this study analyzes the
138. See Meir Dan-C ohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its Audience,
63 U. CoLO. L. Rev. 569, 574 (1992); see also Roger C. Cramton, 'The Most Remarkable Institution":
The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 10 (1986) (stating that articles "are not as directly
applicable to the probleras practitioners face" and that "they frequently employ a scholarly jargon and
theoretical framework that practitioners do not understand, [so] they are of much less utility").
139. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 138, at 574.
140. See id.
141. Id, at 587.
142. See, e.g., Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty
Scholarship Survey, 70 CHt.-KENT L. Rev. 1445 (1996) [hereinafter Cullen & Kalberg, 1996 Faculty
Survey]; Executive Board, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 65 CHi-KENT L. REv.
195 (1989); Lawrence M. Friedman, et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33
STAN L. Rev. 773 (1981); Janet M. Gumm, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 509 (1990) [hereinafter Gumm, 1990 Faculty Surveyl;.James Lindgren & Daniel
Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 Cm.-KENT L. R-v. 781 (1996); William H.
Manz, The Citation Pra.:tices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121
(1995); Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals
Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CM.-KEi'r L. REv. 871 (1996); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited
Law Review Articles, 73 CAL L. REv. 1540 (1985) [hereinafter Shapiro, Most.Cited]; Fred R. Shapiro,
The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 751 (1996) [hereinafter Shapiro,
Revisited]; Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court:
An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. Rev, 131 (1986) [hereinafter Sirico, Supreme Court Study]; Louis J.
Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An
Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991) [hereinafter Sirico, Appeals Court Survey]; Bart
Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing For? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal
Bench, 1986-1990, 61 G3O WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
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citation to law reviews by the United States Supreme Court, federal circuit courts of
appeal, federal district courts, and state supreme courts, during three two-year periods
spaced ten years apart. The first period covers December 31, 1974, through January
1, 1977 (essentially the years 1975 and 1976). The second and third periods cover
the years 1985-86 and 1995-96, respectively, in the same manner. Two-year periods
were chosen to obtain broad samples and thus to minimize distortion caused by any
particular opinion that contained a disproportionate number of citations or by a single
article that garnered a large number of citations. The three periods were chosen to
allow for a trend analysis of citation practices over the past twenty years.
This survey utilized the list of leading law journals selected by the Chicago-Kent
Law Review, which conducts periodic citation surveys.'43 Specifically, the list was
taken from Table I of the 1996 Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship
Survey (1996 Chicago Kent Survey), which compiled its ranking from Shepard's Law
Review Citations.'" Shepard's counts citations in federal and state courts and about
one hundred fifty law journals, including the leading student-edited law reviews of
many law schools.45 However, it leaves out most faculty-edited law reviews and
interdisciplinary journals'" so that for the most part, only traditional, student-edited,
general interest law reviews appear in the survey. The journals selected by the 1996
Chicago-Kent Survey, utilized in this survey, represent a good sample from which to
determine which student-edited law reviews are heavily cited. The 1996 Chicago-
Kent Survey selected three volumes of each law review beginning in 1987, intention-
ally omitting Shepard's recording of self-citations and citation in cases, and ranked
the reviews by the total number of citations from the date of the law review's
publication through the June 1993 issue of Shepard's.47 Conversely, this survey
ranks the same law reviews by the total number of citations by courts and compares
the two rankings in Appendix I.
After selecting the law reviews for this survey, a Westlaw search was conducted
to find the number of citations to a journal in the particular court and for the year
selected. 48 The searches were conducted in the United States Supreme Court
(SCT),'4 9 United States Circuit Courts of Appeals (CTA),t" United States District
Courts (DCT)"' and State Supreme Courts (ALLSTATES)" databases for the
143. See Cullen & Kalberg, 1996 Faculty Survey, supra note 142; Executive Board, supra note 142;
Gumm, 1990 Faculty Survey, supra note 142; Lindgren & Seltzer, supra note 142; Merritt & Putnam,
supra note 142; Shapiro, Most-Cited, supra note 142; Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 142.
144. See Cullen & Kalberg, 1996 Faculty Survey, supra note 142, at 1446-47 & tbl. I.
145. See id. at 1446.
146. See id. at 1447.
147. See id.
148. The searches are listed in Appendix 11. The "Bluebook citation" was always utilized first, and
the other variations were included in an attempt to credit any improper cites, although these alternatives
rarely reveal additional citations.
149. SCT database contains all U.S. Supreme Court Cases from 1945 to the present.
150. CTA database contains all U.S. Court of Appeals cases from 1945 to the present.
151. DCT database contains all U.S. District Court cases from 1945 to the present.
152. ALLSTATES database contains all State Supreme Court cases from all 50 states from 1945
to the present.
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selected year groups. The compiled data were then entered into a computer database
to produce the graphs and tables in Appendix I.
This survey is not presented as qualitatively perfect, and certain factors that would
affect the number of citations of any one journal were not taken into account. For
example, there were inherent problems with using Westlaw searches to count
citations to law review articles. Most notably, courts do not always use Bluebook
format. If Bluebook format is used, the spacing of the citation in its online
reproduction is not standard, which can affect the ability of the search engine to find
the citation." Furher, some law reviews have changed names or abbreviations, for
instance Columbia, which during the beginning of the 1970s was abbreviated "Col.
L. Rev." but is cited today as "Colum. L. Rev." Similarly, many journals have
secondary reviews that might accidentally be picked up in a search for a specific law
review. For example, in the search for the "UCLA L. Rev.," several cites to the
UCLA-Alaska Law Review appeared. The survey is, however, sufficiently accurate
to generally compare law reviews and to get a sense of the trend of decreasing
citation. A random sampling of nine of the journals in the survey revealed an error
percentage of slightly less than 0.5 %.,5
B. Hypothesis and Results
This survey was conducted to provide empirical verification that legal scholarship
has become less relevant to the practice of law. If judges and practitioners are
correct, then there should be a decrease in the use of legal scholarship in judicial
opinions and briefs. Further, when they do cite law review articles, judges and
practitioners should cite markedly different articles than those cited by academicians.
The results of this survey support this hypothesis.
The number of judicial citations of law reviews in each of the courts surveyed
declined dramatically from 1975 to 1996. As evidenced by the tables in Appendix
I, there was a 47.35% decrease in overall citations by the federal courts and state
supreme courts combined. Federal court citations decreased 45% over the survey
period. The results for each specific court were equally dramatic. Citations in the
153. For example, the Southern California Law Review was found abbreviated: 1) "S._Cal. L.
Review"; 2) "So._ C._ L._ Rev."; 3) "S._ C._ L._ Rev."; 4) "S.C._ L.Rev"; and 5) "S.C.L.Rev."
154. Of the nine law reviews that were selected, all of these Westlaw "hits" were reviewed for
accuracy if there were fewer than 50 total citations. If there were over 50 citations, a random sample of
the total hits was reviewved for accuracy. In total, 1942 "hits" were reviewed for accuracy and revealed
nine citations that were not attributable to the journal that was the focus of the search. The precise error
rate was 0.463%. Individually, each journal produced the following error percentages:
Harvard Law Review: 600 hits checked / 0 errors = 0%
Yale Law Journal: 525 hits checked / 0 errors = 0%
Columbia Law Revi.-w: 492 hits checked / 0 errors = 0%
UCLA Law Review 217 hits checked / 5 errors = 2.3%
Southern California Law Review: 210 hits checked / 0 errors = 0%
Brooklyn Law Review: 89 hits checked / 0 error = 0%
California Law Review: 243 hits checked / 4 errors = 1.7%
University of Florida Law Review: 85 hits checked / 0 errors = 0%
University of Califonia at Davis Law Review: 6 hits checked / 0 errors = 0%
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United States Supreme Court, while increasing slightly in the 1980s, plummeted
65.0% over the next ten years for an overall decrease of 58.6% for the twenty-year
period. Federal circuit court citations decreased 56.0%. Federal district court citations
decreased 24.8%, and state supreme court citations decreased 46.8%.
In addition, this survey reveals that judges and practitioners appear willing to cite
articles in journals that are not traditionally regarded as "elite." As a preliminary
matter, however, no survey of law review citations could fail to conclude that most
court citations refer to journals that are generally regarded as elite,' and this
survey reaches the same conclusion. Across the board, the most frequently cited
journals, reflected in the Appendix I rankings, were the Harvard Law Review and the
Yale Law Journal. These two schools topped the list of each of the courts studied in
this survey. Similarly, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, the Columbia
Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, and the Texas Law Review were ranked in
the top ten of each court in this survey."
The more interesting discovery of this survey, however, is that while the elite
journals top the list of judicial citations, many judicial citations are to journals that
are generally not regarded as elite. While most of the top ten law reviews remained
the same from the 1996 Chicago-Kent Survey, several surprises appeared in the top
twenty. In the federal courts, the Minnesota Law Review moved from twenty-fourth
to tenth; the Iowa Law Review moved from fortieth to sixteenth; and the Georgia
Law Review moved from thirty-seventh to twenty-first.
In the state supreme courts, many of these same reviews appeared in the top ten.
Minnesota moved from twenty-fourth to seventh; the Hastings Law Journal moved
from thirty-fourth up to eighth; and the Iowa Law Review moved from fortieth to
ninth. While the elite journals certainly top every list, courts appear more at ease
than academics in citing journals that are not generally considered "elite."
Beyond this survey, the results of previously conducted surveys are consistent with
the hypothesis of this article. A citation study of the United States Supreme Court,
published in the UCLA Law Review in 1986, noted a 20% decline in the use of
scholarship over a seven-year period, studying citations for the years 1971 to 1973
155. See Sirico, Supreme Court Study, supra note 142, at 132 (noting the dominance of the elite
journals); see also Sirico, Appeals Court Survey, supra note 142, at 154-55 (noting that most citations
refer to journals that are generally regarded as elite).
156. Several theories have been proffered to explain the dominance of the elite journals in judicial
citation. Some have speculated that the dominance of these journals may result from their high quality.
See Sirico, Supreme Court Survey, supra note 142, at 133; Sirico, Appeals Court Survey, supra note 142,
at 1055. In addition, courts may tend to cite journals because they believe that a journal's name will
increase the article's persuasive power. Sirico, Supreme Court Survey, supra note 142, at 133; Sirico,
Appeals Court Survey, supra note 142, at 1055. Finally, it has been suggested that many judicial clerks
are chosen from elite schools and may tend to cite the publication of their respective alma maters. Sirico,
Supreme Court Survey, supra note 142, at 133; Sirico, Appeals Court Survey, supra note 142, at 1055.
These explanations cover the gamut of possible explanations for the dominance of the elite journals.
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and 1981 to 1983." The survey suggested that the decline was most likely
attributable to the decreasing utility of law reviews to the bar and bench.'
The 1986 UCLA study offered two possible explanations for the decline. First, the
authors hypothesized that the decrease may be due to changes in the composition of
the Supreme Cout during the period of the study."9 However, this theory was
dismissed, as the survey observed that none of the justices appeared to be abnormally
sparing or free in citing secondary sources." The other explanation suggested by
the study was that the court may find legal scholarship decreasingly useful because
"[a] growing portion of academic writing, particularly in the elite journals, may be
directed toward the scholar, rather than the bar or the bench.'
61
Most revealing, a citation survey appearing in the Chicago-Kent Law Review in
1996 by Debora J. Merritt and Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and
Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles? (the judicial survey),
revealed that judges and practitioners cite articles that focus on different legal
scholarship.'" The judicial survey compared a list of the top ten articles cited by
courts, with a prior survey conducted by Fred Shapiro" that ranked the top ten
articles cited by other law reviews in the years 1989, 1990, and 1991.'" As the
judicial survey noted, "[t]he composition of these lists differs dramatically."' s
Shapiro's survey contained the thirty most-cited law review articles in scholarly
journals. Of these articles, which received over fifty citations each in scholarly
journals (with some attaining well over one hundred citations), only twelve have ever
been cited in a judicial opinion." Further, the academic survey revealed that more
than two-thirds of the articles cited in scholarly journals received only one, if any,
judicial citation. 67
In contrast, two of the articles most frequently cited by courts in the judicial
survey received no citations in scholarly journals.'" Over one-third of the articles
cited by courts received fewer than ten citations in scholarly journals. Close to two-
thirds of the articles cited by courts received fewer than twenty scholarly journal
citations.'" The judicial survey summarized that, "[e]ven accounting for the
possibility that popular, scholarly articles elicit judicial citations after a time lag, the
difference between our lists and Shapiro's lists is striking."'70
157. See Sirico, Supreme Court Study, supra note 142, at 134 (hesitating to attribute the decline to
a quirk in the samples).
158. See id.
159. See id
160. See id at 135.
161. Id.
162. See Merritt & Putnam, supra note 142.
163. See Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 142.
164. See Shapiro, Most-Cited, supra note 142, at 1540-42.





170. Id at 882. The survey hypothesized that there is a delay in time between an article's
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After noting this divergence, the judicial survey categorized the differences and
similarities of the two lists by subject matter, theoretical perspectives employed, and
the stature of the journals in which they appeared. Their findings support the
assertions of judges and practitioners that many articles are irrelevant to practical
judicial decision making.
The subject matter delineation revealed that one-half of the articles in Shapiro's
survey concerned race or sex discrimination.' Conversely, only one article cited
by a court in the judicial survey explicitly addressed sex or race discrimination and
"even that article does not focus exclusively on those issues."'" Many of the
articles cited by the courts, however, were highly "theoretical."'" The judicial
survey noted that, "courts do not eschew theoretical discussions by scholars, as long
as they perceive those discussions as helpful in resolving the controversies before
them."
174
Additionally, the judicial survey noted that five of its thirty articles focused on the
law of a single state and received all of their citations from the courts of a single
state. Conversely, none of the articles in Shapiro's survey concentrated on the law
of a particular state and received their citations from a number of courts. 7 This
conclusion supports the argument of the Virginia Law Review's 1936 article,76
which called for state law reviews to focus on the law of their particular jurisdiction.
Similarly, these conclusions, when taken together, support the claims of judges and
practitioners, that they often consult and cite articles that have been tailored to a
specific topic relevant to their practice.
V. Conclusion
This survey set out to find evidence supporting the assertions of judges and
practitioners that legal scholarship is becoming less relevant to the practice of law.
The results evidence a substantial drop in the citation of law review articles by
courts. Further, the survey indicates that judges and practitioners cite to different
journals than academics. These results, and the results of the previous surveys
discussed in this article, are consistent with the observations of judges and
publication and its acceptance by the courts that may have influenced the low number of citations by the
courts to recent articles. See id. at 880-82. The study presented in this paper also found that articles cited
by the courts tended to be written in a previous decade, as evidenced in Appendix III.
171. See id. at 882-90.
172. Id. at 883. In the academic survey, many of the recent articles analyzed legal issues from a
feminist, critical race theory, or critical legal studies perspective. See id. at 886. In fact, the judicial
survey notes that Shapiro estimated that two-thirds of the articles in the academic survey published in
1990 or 1991 employ one of these theoretical perspectives. See id. (citing Shapiro, Revisited, supra note
142, at 758). Conversely, the judicial survey revealed that "none of the articles on our 1989-1991 lists
adopts an explicitly feminist, critical race, or critical legal studies perspective." Id.
173. See supra note 80-82 and accompanying text.
174. Merritt & Putnam, supra note 142, at 888.
175. See id. at 885.
176. See Weiner, supra note 41.
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practitioners, and evidence that modem legal scholarship is losing touch with the
practice of law.
The decline in citation evidenced in this survey is not conclusive proof that legal
scholarship is of diminishing utility to judges and practitioners. In fact, several
alternative explanations have been offered for the decreases. One reason may be an
increase in the docket load of courts that precludes researching secondary sources."
Another possibility is that the increased numbers of law journals and articles have
diluted their potency such that "on-point" articles are impossible to find. Finally,
judges and practitioners may have given up reading law reviews altogether and
therefore do not know what articles would or would not be of use to their practices.
However, judges and practitioners claim there are too many impractical articles and
not enough traditional articles that speak to their everyday needs. They themselves
have written many articles and given many speeches asking for scholarship that
address issues they confront. The requests seem genuine. Further, with their busy
schedules, it is not probable that judges and practitioners are inventing this problem
as an excuse to defend their disinterest in the scholarship being produced. It seems
unlikely with the proliferation of computer research that docket loads or the increased
number of journals has contributed to the decrease in citation by the courts. In light
of the heated debate between academia and the bar, the decline in legal scholarship
seems at least in part attributable to the proliferation of impractical scholarship.
Justice Frankfurter stated, "the law is what the lawyers are."'78 The question
currently facing layw review boards and authors is whether law reviews will continue
to contain what the practicing lawyers feel that law is. It may be that specialized
commercial and bz" journals are the proper forum for the scholarship interests of
judges and practiftoners. However, law reviews have historically sought to be
influential tools for practitioners and judges. The consequence of not responding to
judges and practitioners may be that many important issues will be decided without
the input of academic lawyers.
It is not the aim of this article to suggest that law reviews become a doctrinal
exposition for judges. Rather, the debate is properly focused on the "middle
ground""' where both theoretical interdisciplinary work and doctrinal law review
articles exist. Ideally, there needs to be a healthy balance of both theory and doctrine.
However, the conclusions of this survey, combined with the results of previous
surveys, demonstrate the need for more scholarship tailored toward the practicing bar.
Editorial boards and authors should give greater consideration to the needs of judges
and practitioners if law reviews are to continue to influence the law as an
authoritative secondary source and in order to dispel the resurfacing prejudice against
student-edited law journals.
177. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
110 (1990); WILLIAM ). MCLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 73-109 (1984).
178. Edwards, supra note 71, at 34 (citing Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law
School, to Mr. Rosenwald (May 13, 1927) (Felix Frankfurter papers, Harvard Law School library),
quoted in RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING
VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 156 (1989)).
179. See Gordon, supra note 86, at 2077.
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Ranking of Law Reviews: Total Citations by all Courts
Law School £hcKwt Total 95-96 Total 85-86 Total 75-76 Total Citations
I HaMMrd Law School 1 513 1172 1513 3198
2 Yale Law School 2 341 545 724 1610
3 Columbia Law Review 4 284 558 585 1145
4 Texas Law Review 11 242 356 293 891
5 Michigan Law Review 3 170 280 327 777
6 University of Pennsylvania aw Review 7 121 281 330 732
7 University of Chicago Law Review 8 15 263 286 700
8 Minnesota Law Review 24 152 236 254 642
9Virgiia Law Review 5 108 271 232 611
10 California Law Review 9 137 210 206 553
i1 Stanfod Law Review 6 118 195 207 520
12 New York University Law 22 133 182 189 504
13 Vanderbilt Law Review 18 136 187 139 462
14 lowaLaw Review 40 91 191 170 452
15 Hastins aLaw Journal 34 91 168 154 413
16 Tulane Law Review 28 107 155 140 402
17 UCLA Law Review 16 103 124 140 367
18 Georgetown Law Journal 14 79 148 117 344
19 Cornell Law Review 13 94 127 120 341
20 Southern California Law Review 12 78 116 112 306
21 North Carolina Law Review 23 77 126 87 290
22 Duke Law Journal 10 81 107 99 287
23 Northwestern University Law Review 21 64 83 121 268
24 Wisconsin Law Review 17 70 68 77 215
25 Ohio State Law Journal 19 51 78 60 189
26 Boston University Law Review 29 43 74 62 179
27 Maryland Law Review 35 40 58 76 174
2 Georgia Law Review 37 36 89 31 156
29 Business Lawyer 15 47 67 35 149
30 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 39 47 47 44 138
31 Brook]l Law Review 32 43 43 45 131
32 William and Mary Law Review 27 45 48 24 117
33 University of Cincinnati Law Review 33 41 36 31 108
34 Alabama Law Review 25 28 45 24 105
35 University of Florida Law Review 30 16 35 34 85
36 University of Miami Law Review 36 23 39 22 84
37 Chicago-Kent Law Review 20 15 24 12 51
38 Notre Dame Law Review 26 2 1 3 6
39 U. Califomia at Davis Law Review 38 0 1 5 6
40 San Diego Law Review 31 0 1 1 2
Total Court Citations: U.S. Supreme Court; U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal;
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Ranking of Law Reviews: Total Citations by the U.S. Supreme Court
Law School CiaoKn C959 ST8-6 C 776Total Citations
iHarvard Law School 1 15 56 56121
_2Yale Law School 2 18 31 27 7f
3 2olmbia Law Review 4 4 39 19 61
.4University of Pennsylvania Law Review 7 4 17 26 41
, University of Chicago Law Review 8 6 17 22 43
Virginia Law Review 5 3 is 15 33
71 Stanford Law Review 6 3 15 11. 29
, Michigan Law Review 3 2 13 10 V5
Texas Law Review II 6 to 9: 25
to Minnesota Law Review 24 4 11 10 23
I I New York University Law 22 7 10, 7 24
_2 Georg etown Law Journal 14 1 6 11 1 E
_3 Iowa Law Review 40 4 6 6 1 f
14 UCLA vw Review 16, 6 6 4 If
15. California Law Review 9 2 0 2. 16
16 Northwestern University aw Review 21 3 2 7 12
17 Boston University Law Review 29 3 1 7 11
ig Vanderbilt Law Review 18 3 4 4 11i
19 North Carolina Law Review 23 3 3 4 10
20 southern :alifomia Law Review 12 5 4 II 10
21 Duke Law Journal to 0 6 31 9
22 Hastings Law Journal 341 0 4 51
23 Comli Law Review 1131 01 51 3.
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iw Review 1 _ 331 11 11 21 4
251 21 21 4
Chicago-Kent Law Review
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Ranking of Law Reviews: Total Citations by the U.S. Courts of Appeal
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 7 31 89
Michigan Law Review _ I3 761
13.omell Law Review 13_ 282 Duk  Law Review 0 _ 
Iowa Law Review 40 1 1 301 25 66
UCLA Law Review 16 24 20 22 66
California Law Review 9 20 17 19 56
Boston Universit-y Law Review 29 10 20 14 44
Hastings Law Journal 34 12 18 14 44
South Carolina Law Review 12 13 7 22 42
North Carolina Law Review 23 12 14015 41
Georgia Law Review 37 8 22 11 41
Business Lawyer 15 6. 19 __ 15 40
William and Mary Law Review 27 8 1"7 9 34
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 39 11 10 12 33
Ohio State Law Jouma! 19 11 11 9 31
University of Cincinnati Law Review 33 7 8 12 27
Brooklyn Law Review 32 10 10 7 27
Maryland Law Review 35 8 6 8 22
U. California at Davis Law Review






Nre Dame Law Review 261 11 01 01 1
San Diego Law Review 311 0_ 01 01 0
Total Citations by
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Ranking of Law Reviews: Total Citations by the U.S. District Courts
4 Ioa of Pe vana Law Review 
7 21 62
isul Law Review 5 26 851 30 141
Michigan Law Review 3 49 3 41 128
7 University of Chicao Law Review 8 42 48 35 125
New York Univrsit Law 22 23 3 39 97
Minnesota Law Review 24 32 321 30 94
2Lo Texas Law Review 21 37 31 22 90
22 Stanford Law Review 6 35 29. 26 90
2 Georgetown Law Journal 14 23 31 22 7613. Vanderbilt Law Review 18 28 321 10 70
_4 Iowa Law Review 40 12 23[ 23 58
15 Tulane Law Review 28 26 171 I0 53
16 UCLA Law Review 16 23 15l 13 51
7 DuketLaw Journal 10 17 14 19 50
18 Cornell Law Review 13 15 16. P7 48
19 California Law Review 9 14 171 15 46
2o Business Lawyer 15 20 17 8 45
21 Northwestern University Law Review 21 13 10 21 4
_R Georgia Law Review 37 11 22! 9 42
2Hastings Law Journal 34 15 14; 9 38
24[ Boston University Law Review 29 10 14 9 33
2s1 North Carolina Law Review 23 10 17 4 31
9 7 Ohio State Law Journal 19 13 7 7 27
2Southern California Law Review 12 11 9 7 27
28! Wisconsin Law Review 17 10 7 9 26
29: Maryland Law Review 35 10 8 7 25
30 I University of Pittsburgh Law Review 39 12 4 8 24
31l Brooklycn Law Review 32 10 8 5 23
32! William and Mary Law Review 27 11I 5 1 17
33; University of Cincinnati Law Review 33 9 3 4 1;
34 University of Miami Law Review 36 7 3 2 12
351 Alabama Law Review 25 F 3 3 I11
36 Chieago,-Knt Law Review 20 0 6 1 7
37 Unversity of Florida law Review 30 12 36
38 Notre Dame Law Review 26 0 1 0
9 Sa* iejo, Lw Review 31 ] 
00
40 U. aIfonia tat Davis Law Review 38 0 0 0
Total Citations by
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Ranking of Law Reviews: Total Citations by the State Supreme Courts
I Law School Chlcan-Kent STATE 95-96 STATE 85-86 STATE 75-76TL
I-IarvardLaw School 11 2441 546 616 1406
2 Yale Law School 2 158 278 392 828
3 Columbia Law Review 4 142 259 270 671
4 Texas Law Review _11 168 258 208 634
51 California Law Review 9 101 176 
170 447
6 Michigan Law Review 3 85 153 203 441
7 Minnesota Law Review 24 90 150 153 393
8 Hastings Law Journal 34 64 132 126 322
9 lowaLawReview - 40 64 132 116 312
10 University of Pennsylvan!a Law Review 7 65 113 125 30
11 Vanderbilt Law Review 18 80 115 96 3291
12 Virginia Law Review 5 58 108 108 274
13 Stanford Law review 6 56 103 115 274
14 Tulane Law Review 28 62 97 113 272
15 University of Chicago Lao' Review 8 57 92 105 254
16 New York University Law Review 22 59 96 96 251
17 UCLA Law Review 16 50 83 101 234
18 Southern Califomia Law Review 12 49 96 82 227
19 North Carolina Law Revisw 23 52 92 64 2F8
20 Cornell Law Review 13 51 64 56 171
21 Wisconsin Law Review 17_ 53 53 59 165
22 Georgetown Law Journal 14 38 73 41 152
23 Northwestern University Law Review 21 28 45 65 138
24 Duke Law Review 10 40 45 44 129
Ohio State aw Journal' 19 27J 57 43 B7
6 Maryland Law Review 35 22 42 61 125
27 Boston University Law Review 29 20 39 32 91
2Brooklyna Law Review 32 22 23 31 -76
29 Universi of PittsburghLaw Review 39 23 30 22 75
3Alabama Law Review 25 15 -39 19 73
31 University of Florida Law Review 30 14 27 26 67
32 Georgia Law Review 37 17 38 10 65
33 University of Cincinnati Law Review 33 24 24 13 61
34 University of Miami Law Review 27 23 25 12 60
35 William and Mary Law Rsvew 36 11 32 16 59
36 Business Lawyer 1s 20 29 9 58
37 Chicago-Kent Law Review 20 10 18 8 36
38 U. California at Davis Law Review 38 0 0 4 4
39 San Diego Law Review 31 0 1 1 2
4 Notre Dame Law Reiew 26 1 0 0 I
Total Citations by
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HARVARD HARV-L-REV "HARV L-REV" (HARV +2 REV)
VALE YALE-L-J "YALE. LJ" "YALE L-J" (YALE+2 IA)
U. PENN U-PA-L-REV "U-PA-L-REV" "U. PA. L REV." (PA +2 L-REV.)
U. CHICAGO U-CHI-L-REV "U-CHI-L-REV" "U. CHI. L REV." (CHI +2 L-REV.)
COLUMBIA COLUM-L-REV "COLUM-L-REV" "COLUM. L REV." COL-L-REV" "COL L. REV."
(COLUM +2 L REV) (COL +2 L-REV)
VIRGINIA VA-L-REV "VA-L-REV" "VA. L REV." (VA +2 L-REV) % (VA-TAX +2 REV)
STANFORD STAN-L-REV "STAN-L-REV" "STAN L REV." (STAN +2 L-REV)
MICHIGAN MICH-L-REV "MICH-L-REV" MICH. L REV." (MICH +2 L-REV)
TEXAS TEX-L-REV "TEX-L-REV" "TEX. L REV." '"TEX. L-REV" TEXAS-L-REV (TEX +2
L-REV) % (TECH +2 L-REV)
NYU N-Y-U-L-REV "N-Y-U-L-REV" "N.Y.U. L REV." N.Y.U. L-REV" NYU-L-REV (N.Y.U.
+2 L-REV)
U. MINNESOTA MINN-L-REV "MINN-L-REV" "MINN. L. REV." "MINN. L-REV" MINN +2 L-REV)
U. IOWA IOWA-L-REV "IOWA-L-REV" "IOWA L REV." "IOWA L-REV" (IOWA +2 L-REV)
U. WISCONSIN WIS-L-REV "WIS-L-REV" "WIS. L. REV." "WIS. L-REV" (WIS +2 L-REV)
U.C.L.A UCLA-L-REV "UCLA-L-REV" "UCLA. L REV." "UCLA. L-REV" U.C.LA.-L-REV (UCLA
+2 L-REV)
NORTHWESTERN NW-U-L-REV "NW-U-L-REV" NW. U. I. REV." " NW. U. L-REV" NV.-U-L-REV
(Nv +3 L-REV)
BOSTON "B-U-L-REV" "B. U. L REV." "B.U. L-REV" B. U.-L-REV (B-U +2 L-REV)
NORTH CAROLINA N-C-L-REV "N-C-L-REV" "N.C. L REV" "N.C. L-REV" N.C.-L-REV (N-C +2 L-REV)
DUKE DUKE-L-J "DUKE-IJ" "DUKE LJ." "DUKE L-J" DUKE-L-J (DUKE +2 L-)








L REV." "CORNELL L-REV" (CO]
INGS-L-J" "HANfINGS. LI. "HASTIN(iS L-J"
r+2 LJ)
)RNELL L-REV" "CORNELL-L-REV" "CORNELL
3RN +2 L-REVi
GA-L-REV GEORGIA L-REV "GA. L-REV" "GEORGIA-L-REV" GA. L REV"
(GA GEORGIA +2 L-REV)
S-CAL-L-REV SO-CAL-L-REV "S. CAL L-REV" "S. CAL L REV." (S-CAL +
TUL-L-REV TULANE-L-REV 'TUL L-REV "TUL. L REV." (TUL TULANE.
U-PfIT-L-REV "U.PITT. L-REV" "U. PITT. L REV." (PIr +2 L-REV)
BROOK-L-REV BROOKLYN L-REV "BROOK. L-REV" "BROOKLYN L-REV
"BROOK. L REV." "BROOKLYN L REV." (BROOK BROOKLYN +2 L-REV
OHIO-ST-L- OHIO-STATE-L-J "OHIO ST. L-J" "OHIO-ST. L-J" "OHIO ST. L
-ST. LJ." (OHIO-ST +2 L-J)
U'-CIIN-L-J 1. L-REV" "U. CIN. L REV." "U. CIN. L-REV" (CIN CINC +2 L-REV)
REV" "'AL L RIE.V "(IAi..ai7I +2 R.V) % (R-CA l..- LREVI
ALABAMA-L-REV ALA-L-RE'
%( ALASKA +2 L-REV)
SAN-DIEGO-L-REV "SAN DIE
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GO L-REV" "SAN DIEGO L REV." "SAN DIEGO L. REV"
L REV." "MD L REV" (MD +2 L-REV)
L-REV" "CHI.-KENT L REV." "CHI-KENT .L. REV."
E-DAME L-REV" "NOTRE DAME L. REV." "NOTRE
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